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This study assesses whether Syrian refugees intend to return to Syria, taking 
account of the economic, cultural and institutional differences between their 
country of origin and the host country. We develop a simple theoretical model 
on return migration and optimal duration of stay in the host country to identify 
the potential trade-offs faced by refugees. We then assess the theoretical 
predictions empirically with a sample of 577 Syrian refugees living in Germany 
and Turkey. Three return scenarios are considered: (i) ever returning, (ii) 
returning when it is as safe in Syria as before the war, and (iii) returning within 
two years. Refugees in the immediately neighbouring country of Turkey are 
more likely to regard their stay as temporary (76%) compared to those who 
fled to geographically more distant Germany (55%, p-value of 
difference=0.000). Concerning the correlates of intended return, we observe 
that socio-demographic and economic characteristics tend to have limited 
predictive power for re-migration intentions, independent of the host country. 
Similarly, while refugees value freedom of speech and belief, the existence of 
these liberties does not feed into the return migration decision in either of the 
host countries. Thus, attempts to impose these values on the Assad 
Government are unlikely to trigger mass return movement. From a policy 
perspective, we analyse whether random exposure to positive or negative 
information regarding return migration impacts on the refugees’ intentions. We 
find no systematic impact on the decision to migrate back. This demonstrates 
that host governments cannot expect (rapid) information disseminated by 
refugee agencies – even if it provides support – to impact the refugees’ 
decision making about return. Overall, the analysis suggests that neither 
proximate nor distant host countries should bank on the speedy return of the 
Syrian refugees but should focus on refugee integration, independently of how 
long they intend to stay. 
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In March 2020, the Syrian civil war entered into its 10th year. It has resulted in approximately half 
a million civilian deaths, more than 6 million internally displaced people and more than 5.6 million 
refugees (OCHA, 2019; UNHCR, 2019a). The majority of Syrian refugees are concentrated in the 
countries that border Syria, particularly Turkey, but a significant number are also hosted in EU 
countries, mainly Germany (UNHCR, 2019b). The unprecedented influx of Syrian refugees over 
recent years has resulted in political, social and economic challenges for host countries, with social 
tension rising especially in the wake of mass migrations that occurred in 2015. EU citizens are 
concerned that the increase in refugees is concomitantly increasing the risk of terrorism as well as 
reducing the chances for nationals to secure jobs or social benefits (Amaral et al., 2018). The alleged 
threat that refugees pose to host communities is increasingly used by right-wing populist parties in 
Europe to win votes, playing on insecurity and fear and distracting the electorate from national 
issues and failures (Holmes and Castaneda, 2016). 
The UN and some European host countries, as well as the Syrian government, consider the 
return of refugees to their country of origin as the desired solution to the crisis. The reconstruction 
of Syria is intrinsically linked to the country’s political future. Yet, the EU is hesitant to commit 
funds to the reconstruction in light of ethical issues related to being party to consolidating Bashar 
Al-Assad’s victory. For its part, the Syrian government has been discussing its plans for rebuilding 
Syria for some years: in 2016, reconstruction deals were agreed between Russia, China, Iran and 
Syria (Batrawi, 2018). However, concerns about the reconstruction plans seem well founded. A 
report on urban reconstruction in Syria asserts that the Syrian government’s urban reconstruction 
policy is ‘enabling demographic engineering, rewarding political loyalty, and privileging higher 
socioeconomic classes’ using price manipulation, forced eviction and the seizure of refugee 
properties to bar certain strata of the population from accessing newly available housing (Batrawi, 
2018). 
Given the political challenges in the host countries and the unclear future outlook in Syria, the 
research on which this paper is based explores whether Syrian refugees who are located in Germany 
and Turkey consider return migration to be an option. The voices of Syrian refugees have seldom 
entered the debate on refugee policy. Rather, current policies are influenced by the vested interests 
of host countries and other parties to the conflict such as the Syrian government and Russia. 
Another key barrier in making the voices of Syrian refugees heard is the difficulty of accessing 
authentic perspectives from the refugee communities due to cultural and language barriers as well 
as the sensitivity of the topic and the high level of fear and insecurity among refugees in host 
countries. We have overcome these challenges and collected systematic information from 577 
Syrian refugees by employing Syrian nationals directly in the research activities. With this research 
we aim to highlight the needs, aspirations and agency of Syrian refugees in deciding upon their 
future.  
The factors affecting the decision to return depend partly on the specific context and 
environment of Syrian refugees in the host country, but also on the perceived potential for re-
establishing their lives in Syria. This implies that the end of the war is no guarantee that people will 
return. To date, of the more than 5.5 million Syrian refugees worldwide, a very small number have 
returned to Syria. The official stance of UNHCR is that it is not supporting voluntary repatriation 
because the conditions are not yet conducive for refugee returns (UNHCR, 2018). In 2017, an 
estimated 840,000 people returned to their areas of origin in Syria, 77,0001 of which were refugees 
and 764,000 internally displaced people (UNHCR, 2018). However, there are doubts if the returns 
were purely voluntary (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
 
1 19,366 returned from Turkey in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). 
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We empirically assess the willingness of Syrian refugees to return to their country of origin by 
identifying push and pull factors and investigating whether the end of the war would be justification 
enough for returning. We provide a comprehensive quantitative analysis complemented by detailed 
qualitative information. For the case of Syrian refugees, we are not aware of any quantitative study 
assessing the determinants of refugees’ decision to return to their country of origin. We show that 
refugees in neighbouring countries like Turkey are more likely to regard their stay as temporary 
compared to those in Germany. Overall, more than two thirds of the interviewed respondents 
expressed a desire to go back to Syria one day. However, if we present more proximate return 
scenarios, the intention to return is less strong: fewer than 40 per cent indicate that they want to 
go back if Syria is just as safe as before the war, and only about one third intend to go back after 
two years in the host country. This is not surprising given that the interviews were carried out in 
summer 2018 when the war was still ongoing and showing no sign of coming to an end.  
Next we identified the correlates of return migration. Six patterns could be observed. First, 
socio-demographic and economic characteristics tend to have limited predictive power for re-
migration intentions, suggesting that intended return migration is not so much driven by 
background as by other factors such as experiences. Second, with regard to Germany, refugees 
who no longer have assets in Syria are less likely to consider returning. Third, while Syrian refugees 
clearly value freedom of speech and belief, the existence of these liberties does not feed into the 
return migration decision; this is true regardless of where they are hosted. This suggests that 
imposing these values on the Syrian regime is unlikely to trigger mass return migration. Fourth, 
Syrian refugees who place a high value on education seem to have opted for seeking refuge in 
Germany; the more importance they place on education the less likely they are to indicate that they 
want to migrate back. Fifth, theory suggests that over time return migration becomes more likely. 
However, our research identifies a relationship between re-migration intentions and duration of 
stay only if we present a re-migration scenario that suggests return to Syria when the country is as 
safe as it was before the war. Sixth – and most challenging from a policy perspective – we isolate 
the influence of the role of new information through a survey experiment; we assess whether 
random exposure to positive or negative information impacts on the refugees’ intended re-
migration. The results show that information does not systematically influence the decision to 
return. The lack of a reaction to the presented information demonstrates how challenging it is for 
host governments to reach out to the refugees even with supportive messages. Our research shows 
that information shared on the spot or simply handed over in a refugee agency is unlikely to impact 
the refugees’ decision making. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the context of 
the Syrian refugee crisis. Section 3 summarizes the existing literature on return migration. Section 
4 presents a basic theoretical model about return migration of refugees. The survey and data are 
introduced in section 5. The empirical model is presented in section 6 and the results in section 7. 
Section 8 concludes and provides some policy recommendations. 
 
2 CONTEXT 
The war in Syria is considered a highly complex conflict due to the multitude of parties involved. 
These include the Syrian government and its allies, the international coalition led by the United 
States, and the many opposition groups including the Kurds, the People’s Protection Unit, as well 
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), to name but a few (BBC News, 2019). As a result of 
the conflict, Syria’s GDP dropped by an estimated 63 per cent between 2010 and 2016; 68 per cent 
of the country’s health centres have been damaged, 53 per cent of the educational facilities have 
been damaged (with 10 per cent destroyed), 32 per cent of housing is partially or completely 




Due to the fighting and its consequences, many Syrians have left the country. In the early years 
of the crisis civilians fled mainly across the borders. According to the United Nations (OCHA, 
2019; UNHCR, 2019a), the neighbouring countries are currently hosting the vast majority of the 
more than 5.5 million Syrian refugees, with Turkey being the recipient of almost two thirds of 
these. In 2015, when the conflict intensified, people began to cross the Mediterranean seeking 
asylum in Europe. Within Europe, Germany has received the highest number of Syrian refugees 
with 568,785 officially registered Syrian asylum applicants between January 2015 and December 
2019 (Eurostat, 2020). 
For the purpose of this research we rely on the commonly accepted definition of the term 
‘refugee’ from the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention which states that a refugee ‘is someone who 
is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion’ (UNHCR, 2010 pp. 3). Thus, we consider a refugee to be any individual who 
seeks refuge in Germany or Turkey independent of their legal status according to the respective 
host-country rules, as long as they left Syria as a result of war and/or persecution.2  
The context of asylum is intricate in the host countries. We do not engage in any detailed 
definitions of who qualifies as an asylum seeker and what the specific national terms are since this 
would take us beyond the scope of this paper. Along broad lines, the situation for asylum seekers 
in Germany and Turkey is as follows:  
In Germany, the right to asylum is laid down in the constitution (Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees, 2019a) and the country is a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Germany has 
a long history of receiving immigrants and refugees (Constant and Massey, 2003). The total foreign 
population in Germany by the end of December 2018 was about 11 million people (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2018a). Germany is one of the most popular asylum destinations in Europe due to its 
strong economy and favourable policies towards refugees.3 The number of asylum seekers in 
Germany increased radically between 2014 and 2017, largely as a result of the war in Syria, with 
around 1.5 million asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea over that period 
(Grote, 2018). In 2017, 94 per cent of the cases of Syrian nationals seeking asylum in Germany 
were approved (Asylum Information Database, 2018a) making Syrians the largest group among all 
nationalities applying for asylum in Germany and the third biggest community with a migrant 
background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018a). 
Turkey is also a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention but in 2013 established a stand-
alone legal framework implemented by the General Directorate of Migration Management (Asylum 
Information Database, 2018b). Covered under this legal framework are more than 3.5 million 
registered Syrian refugees residing in Turkey (UNHCR, 2020). Syrians who are hosted in Turkey 
as a result of the war in Syria are considered guests under ‘temporary protection’ which entitles 
them to services and assistance in Turkey and specifically the right to stay in Turkey until a more 
permanent solution can be found. However, the temporary protection status does not apply to all 
Syrian refugees that are in Turkey: some have a work permit, others remain unregistered.  
Given that there are more than 6 million internally displaced people in Syria (OCHA, 2019; 
UNHCR, 2019a), return migration has to be narrowly understood: return to a place other than the 
own house, street or village cannot be considered as return unless the refugees themselves have 
chosen this option. Considering the high level of destruction, looting and appropriation of private 
homes across Syria (including reports of private homes taken by the Syrian government and by 
rebel opposition groups for military purposes), as well as the already high population density of the 
 
2 This includes those who have been granted Turkish nationality but fled the country due to the war and still have the 
desire to return to their country of origin. Across host countries, individuals who go to Syria to visit family during the 
Eid festival will also be considered as refugees, as visiting is a different decision compared to returning. Similarly, 
individuals who left Syria before the war for economic and/or persecution related reasons will be considered as 
refugees if they are not able to return to Syria due to the risk of being persecuted and/or killed.  
3 The German system distinguishes between four groups of refugees. We abstain from a detailed discussion. Further 
information can be found from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany (2019c). 
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few areas considered ‘safe’ in Syria, the idea that people can return to their own homes is currently 
not realistic for the majority. Keeping this in mind, our analysis focuses on intended return to a 
place that the refugees would consider their home. 
 
3 LITERATURE ON RETURN MIGRATION 
3.1 Return migration of regular migrants 
The literature on migration is large, covering aspects from the decision to migrate (Levy and 
Wadycki, 1974; Schlottmann and Herzog, 1981) and internal versus international migration (Adams 
and Page, 2005; de Brauw et al., 2014; Lucas, 1997) to wage differentials between host and source 
countries (Dustmann, 2003a), remittances (Akobeng, 2016; Stark and Lucas, 1988) and return 
migration (Collier et al., 2018; Reinhold and Thom, 2013), to name just a few prominent topics.  
Most of the literature focuses on economic migration and migration decisions have mainly 
been modelled as a response to income disparities. Static models of temporary migration suggest 
that migration increases if the wage differential between the country of origin and the host country 
grows (Harris and Todaro, 1970). However, this is not necessarily compatible with empirical data; 
return migration is a common feature across host and source countries (Bartolucci et al., 2018; de 
Coulon and Piracha, 2005; Deléchat, 2001; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; McCormick and 
Wahba, 2001, 2003; Mesnard, 2004; Piracha and Vadean, 2010; Rendon and Cuecuecha, 2010; 
Wahba and Zenou, 2012). It has been documented that migrants tend to work harder than the 
native population and also save more because of their return migration motive (Galor and Stark, 
1990). In a similar vein, early empirical studies established that migrants send remittances as part 
of their return migration plans (Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992). These findings are further 
reinforced by more recent studies: Kirdar (2009) assesses motives for return migration among 
immigrants in Germany and shows that accumulated savings and retirement are important 
predictors. Constant and Massey (2003) further study the most likely points in time for return 
migration. They highlight that immigrants to Germany are most likely to migrate back to their 
country of origin at two distinct moments: (i) either at the beginning of their stay, i.e. in the first 
five years after arrival, or (ii) toward retirement. Dustmann (2003a) shows in a dynamic model of 
migration that migrants may return earlier if wage differentials are larger; empirical evidence is 
provided from immigrants in Germany. 
However, the decision to return is not taken exclusively on economic grounds. 
Complementary empirical evidence indicates that the ambition to return tends to be already present 
when leaving the home country because there is a strong sense of belonging often reinforced by 
perceived discrimination in the host country (Kunuroglu et al., 2018). Similarly, Tezcan (2019) 
shows that Turkish immigrants in Germany are more likely to intend to return when they identify 
as Turkish rather than German. Another motive for return migration is found in concerns about 
children (Dustmann, 2003b).  
The recent literature further nuances the analysis about return migration decisions by 
distinguishing between different types of migrants. Gibson and McKenzie (2011) analyse a sample 
of highly skilled emigrants of Tonga, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea and show that it is not 
forgone income that influences the decision to return but family and lifestyle reasons. Bijwaard and 
Wahba (2014) present evidence for immigrants to The Netherlands, identifying a U-shaped return 
migration pattern with respect to income.  
As can be seen, overall this literature focuses to a large extent on the economic aspects of 
migration and return. It only vaguely discusses cultural and institutional factors as well as the sense 




3.2 Return migration of refugees 
Compared to the large literature on economic migration and return, the literature on refugees is 
considerably smaller. Yet, these two groups of migrants are inherently different. The main 
differences between refugees and economic migrants are (i) their reasons for leaving the country 
of origin, (ii) their legal status in the host country, and (iii) the length of time that they remain out 
of the country of origin (Dadush, 2018). Other differences include their experiences of hardship 
and trauma prior to leaving and their ability to return to a safe environment. We are aware of only 
a few quantitative studies about refugees/illegal migrants and return migration.  
For the case of post-conflict Burundi, Fransen et al. (2017) compare returnees with non-
migrant households and show that in terms of the main source of capital, livestock holding, as well 
as perceived economic well-being, the returnees fare worse. The study that is most closely related 
to our work assesses the intended return migration of illegal migrants from Mexico in the United 
States (Ravuri, 2014). While length of stay is not a significant determinant of intended return, 
ownership of land in Mexico is. In turn, those who invested in property in the United States want 
to stay. 
While the economic literature on return migration of refugees is limited, the political debate 
in the host countries is buoyant and there are numerous migration studies and policy papers 
assessing (assisted) voluntary return and host-country programmes to fund such return (Black et 
al., 2004), as well as the appropriate timing and source country security requirements (Black, 2002). 
For the case of Liberian refugees living in Ghana, Omata (2013) shows that the presence of secure 
shelter, education and job opportunities in their country of origin all feed into refugees’ decision 
to return. In a similar vein, Al-Ali et al. (2001) identify the following factors that prevent Eritrean 
refugees in the United Kingdom from returning home: low wages, no decent health system, lack 
of quality education, and lack of housing. The role of socio-demographic factors in the decision to 
return, such as gender and marital status, remains contested (Black et al., 2004; Bloch and Atfield, 
2000; Harild et al., 2015; Koser and Kuschminder, 2015). Kibreab (2003) distinguishes between 
refuge in developed versus developing countries and argues that refugees in developing countries 
often experience lack of respect and indignity. Moreover, they tend to have no prospect of 
obtaining the rights of citizenship and thus aim for refuge in developed countries if possible or 
return as quickly as possible. Al-Rasheed (1994) studies Iraqi refugees in London, highlighting that 
refugees, even from the same country of origin, are a diverse group and differ substantially in their 
desire to return home. But, according to Koser and Kuschminder (2015), the biggest bottleneck in 
studying refugees’ decision to return is the lack of reliable data to assess the structural and individual 
conditions that affect return migration. This is where our study sets out to make a difference. 
 
4 BASIC THEORETICAL MODEL ABOUT RETURN MIGRATION OF REFUGEES 
Existing theoretical models on return migration tend to focus on skill accumulation, brain drain 
versus brain gain, and work effort (Dustmann et al., 2011; Galor and Stark, 1991). Dustmann and 
Görlach (2016) consolidate the theoretical literature on temporary migration with a general 
dynamic model that can incorporate different assumptions about reasons for going back to the 
country of origin. Similar models have been formulated by Bellemare (2007), Deléchat (2001), 
Kirdar (2012) and Rendon and Cuecuecha (2010), to name just a few. Extensions include border 
enforcement, homesickness and brain drain versus brain gain effects (Angelucci, 2012; Dustmann 
et al., 2011; Lessem, 2018; Nakajima, 2019).  
Yet, in the context under study, migration is not primarily related to personal skills or effort, 
or labour-market prospects in general but to (perceived) country of origin risks. Djajić (2013) 
explicitly incorporates country of origin institutions in his model, in which migration dynamics are 
linked to the process of capital accumulation in the country of origin, i.e. the capital left behind 
6 
 
and the repatriated savings in relation to the depletion of the capital stock due to the costs of 
migration. Yet, with respect to capital accumulation in the country of origin, refugees are different 
from labour migrants. 
We have to account for these differences when conceptually thinking about the decision to 
migrate along with the decision to go back to the country of origin. Concerning the first decision, 
i.e. the decision to flee the country, Djajić (2014) theoretically assesses the optimal way of seeking 
asylum in an advanced country. There are two options for refugees, either to rely on human 
smugglers to get to the safe country of their choice or to apply for resettlement with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The model presented by Djajić (2014) shows 
that young, skilled, non-credit constrained individuals tend to opt for smuggling.  
Since we want to model the decision to flee the country jointly with the return migration 
decision, we use a model that incorporates both decisions. We employ the most basic migration 
model revolving around wage differentials without considering skill formation or capital 
accumulation. There is no uncertainty in the model and no discounting. The model is akin to those 
of Dustmann (2003a) and Dustmann and Weiss (2007). 
In what follows, we use superindex h for the host and o for the country of origin. The refugee 
has the possibility to flee the country of origin at t=0 and dies at t=T. We assume that the refugee 
works until s/he dies and simultaneously decides between staying in the country at war, and moving 
to a safe country, along with decisions concerning the optimal duration of stay and the optimal 
consumption levels in the host country as well as at home. The refugee chooses the optimal 
duration of stay based on a positive wage differential between the country of origin and the host 
country (wo<wh). For simplicity, we assume that wages are constant and we abstract from modelling 
any heterogeneity across migrants.  
The refugee’s lifetime utility function is given by 
 
U= s u(ch, Ih) + (T−s) B(τInfo) u(co, Io),                                       (1) 
 
where s is the time spent in the host country, and consumption levels in the host and origin country 
are given by ci, with i=h, o. The utility function u(.) has the standard properties of increasing in all 
elements but at a decreasing rate. We assume that refugees have a desire for consumption in both 
the host and the origin country. The refugee also derives utility from the institutional environment 
through aspects such as security, access to health, education and legal services. This is denoted as 
Ii, with i=h, o. While host countries tend to have better institutional environments in general, they 
can explicitly apply disincentives for refugees to come and stay by imposing lengthy interrogations 
and procedures designed to deter. Thus, Ii, captures not only the institutional differences between 
a country at war and a peaceful country, but also the institutional difficulties that are imposed upon 
the individuals in both environments. Finally, the function B(.) indicates the refugee’s sense of 
belonging and preference for the location of consumption. In the baseline scenario we treat B(.) as 
a fixed parameter. But we can also allow B(.) to depend on information shocks. A positive 
information shock τInfo>1 about the situation in the country of origin results in an increase in B(.) 
and thus in a relative utility gain of country of origin utility versus host-country utility, whereas a 
negative information shock τInfo<1 represents a relative utility loss. We assume that consumption in 
the country of origin is preferred to consumption in the host country and thus B>1. This implies 
that at identical levels of consumption in the host and origin country the level of utility is higher if 
the consumption takes place in the country of origin. 
The refugee maximizes lifetime utility with respect to ch, co, and s, subject to the lifetime budget 
constraint or total income  
 




where the parameter p denotes the relative price of consuming in the host relative to the origin 
country. If p>1, consumption in the country of origin is more expensive compared to consumption 
in the host country – a scenario that is possible given the conflict situation at home. The costs of 
finding refuge abroad are denoted by k. Since it is not unusual that families pool their resources to 
send a family member to a safe country, we factor these costs in the lifetime budget constraint. Put 
differently, instead of savings the migrant pays for the costs of her/his escape.  
The model allows for two corner solutions concerning the optimal length of stay in the host 
country, namely s→0 and s→T referring to the situation that an individual never leaves the country 
of origin and the situation of permanent migration, respectively. For interior solutions concerning 
the optimal length of stay in the host country we take the first derivative of the Lagrangian with 
respect to the optimal time of return s* and combine terms such that: 
 
𝑌′ ((wh− wo) +(pco −ch)) − (B(τInfo) 𝑢′𝑐𝑜(c
o, Io) − 𝑢′𝑐ℎ(c
h, Ih)) = 0                  (3) 
 
This is the equilibrium condition which determines the optimal duration of stay in the host 
country. 𝑌′ is the marginal utility of lifetime income. The benefit of remaining for an additional 
unit of time in the host country is represented by ((wh− wo) + (pco −ch)). This term is positive given 
our assumptions but decreasing in s. In turn, the term (B(τInfo) 𝑢′𝑐𝑜(c
o, Io) − 𝑢′𝑐ℎ(c
h, Ih)) is the cost of 
staying for an additional unit of time in the host country. This second term is also positive but 
increasing in s. Taking the derivative with respect to the duration of stay from equation (3), it can 
be shown that the difference in benefit and costs decreases over the duration of stay. 
We can now identify four basic scenarios that lead to return migration. In the baseline scenario 
with better economic conditions in the host country wh>wo, negligible differences in (the perceived) 
institutional environment Ih=Io, and identical costs of consumption p=1 but preferences for 
consumption at home B(.)>1, lifetime income rises in s. This implies that the value of staying in 
the host country for an additional period decreases as lifetime income increases due to the 
decreasing utility of lifetime income, leading to a reduction in the migration duration to reduce 
forgone consumption at home. The bigger the preference for being at home, the shorter the 
duration of stay. In turn, the better the economic condition in the host country relative to the home 
country, the more likely the refugee will stay. 
In a second scenario we change the costs of consumption to p <1 implying higher purchasing 
power of the host-country currency in the country of origin. We set the preference parameter to 
indifference between the country of origin and the host country, B(.)=1, keep the perceived lack of 
difference between the institutional environments Ih=Io, and stick to the wage differential wh>wo. 
This leads eventually to return migration because of the higher costs of living in the host country 
and the resulting lower consumption there. At home a higher consumption can be achieved with 
the host-country currency. 
The third scenario focuses on institutional differences with the host country offering better 
protection, Ih>Io. We assume identical economic conditions faced by the refugees in both countries 
wh=wo, and identical costs of consumption p=1 but preferences for consumption at home B(.)>1. 
In this scenario we observe a trade-off between the utility derived from a better institutional 
environment in the host country and the desire to consume at home. If institutional gains can be 
accumulated, such as host-country passports, we eventually observe return migration. The easier it 
is to accumulate these institutional benefits, the shorter the duration of stay in the host country.  
In the three scenarios presented above, we kept the preference parameter B(.) fixed. In the 
fourth scenario we assume a positive information shock τInfo>1 about the situation in the country 
of origin implying that the utility derived at home appreciates in value B(τInfo)>B(.) where B(.) is the 
baseline country of origin preference. Assuming better economic conditions in the host country 
wh>wo, negligible differences in (the perceived) institutional environment Ih=Io, and identical costs 
of consumption p=1, we arrive at an interior solution akin to scenario 1 if the resulting preference 
function B(.) is greater than 1. This last scenario hinges on the relative effect of the information 
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shock on the country of origin utility. In turn, negative information shocks are likely to expand the 
duration of stay in the host country.  
So far, we have neglected the costs of migration. These negatively affect total lifetime income. 
If we assume that host-country income is higher compared to country of origin income wh>wo while 
keeping all other parameters identical in the two countries, we observe an increasing propensity for 
return migration over the lifetime of a refugee. As a consequence of the decreasing utility of lifetime 
income, the value of staying in the host country for an additional period decreases as lifetime 
income increases. Consequently, if the initial investment was larger, the refugee is likely to stay 
longer in the host country. 
While all the cases seem extreme in the context of war, displacement and refuge, it is possible 
for a refugee, who initially opts for a host country that is culturally very different, to move back to 
their unstable home because of a sense of belonging. As Black et al. (2004) highlight in their 
conceptual considerations about return migration of refugees, social relations such as family back 
home are an important ingredient in the decision to return. Similarly, policies might create 
economic and institutional incentives or disincentives for refugees to stay on in the safe country 
by, for example, allowing refugees to seek work (Black et al., 2004). Lastly, the procedure of 
registration in the host country can be made so burdensome that trust in the host-country 
institutions vanishes and fear may even develop. Thus, while the above model is simplistic, it 
incorporates some key elements of seeking refuge and of potentially leaving the safe haven again. 
Most importantly, the model suggests return migration dynamics vary depending on the perceived 
differences between the country of origin and the host country. We are interested in assessing 
exactly these heterogeneous reactions to the host-country environment by contrasting refugees 
from the same country of origin who are located in two different host countries.  
 
5 SURVEY AND DATA 
5.1 Survey Set-up, Study Population and Sampling 
The host countries of Germany and Turkey were selected for this study for three reasons. First, 
they represent the host countries with the highest number of Syrian refugees in their respective 
areas. Second, they play key roles in policy discussions and actions about refugee management as 
manifested in the EU Turkey Refugee deal and the EU Migrant Relocation and Resettlement 
scheme. Third, the two host countries represent completely different contexts in terms of 
proximity to Syria and economic, political and cultural conditions, allowing for a comparative 
analysis about the possible push and pull factors outlined in the theoretical model.  
The study population are Syrian refugees who moved to Germany and Turkey as a result of 
the war in Syria, i.e. after 2011. The selection criteria were as follows: respondents had to be at least 
18 years old and have the autonomy to take the decision to return for themselves and, if applicable, 
for their families. As a result of these criteria, the majority of respondents are male heads of 
household, in line with dominant Syrian culture in which the husband (or eldest male) is the 
decision maker for the family. There was no restriction on the date of arrival (as long as it was after 
2011) or the current legal status in the host country. 
The questionnaire was developed based on the existing literature, qualitative assessments 
carried out prior to the survey and the experience of working with Syrian refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) for five years. The questionnaire was initially formulated in English and 
then translated into Arabic to ensure proper comprehension. Questions about return migration, 
the sense of belonging and institutional preferences are very sensitive for refugees. Refugees tend 
to be afraid that voicing their opinion freely might affect their situation in the host country as well 
as in relation to the Syrian regime. We therefore took great care in setting up the survey and in 
creating a safe environment during the interviews. Data collection ethics were implemented with 
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an explicit focus on the privacy and anonymity of the respondents and the need for sensitivity 
when asking about difficult experiences such as loss of family members. Ethical approval for this 
study was obtained from the ISS Research Ethics Committee. Participation in the survey was 
voluntary, informed consent was obtained from all respondents. The digital data collection 
platform KoBoToolbox was used for the data collection. 
While we had aimed for proportional random sampling, we could not get the necessary 
sampling frames and did not want to risk biased answers as a consequence of institutional 
involvement. We therefore opted for exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling.4 While 
we cannot claim representativeness given our sampling approach, we could at least minimize 
response bias by implementing this referral approach. To counteract the limitations of the snowball 
sampling, we aimed for representativeness in the initial selection of the survey locations. To cover 
as broad a respondent base as possible, we employed Syrian enumerators who do not all know 
each other, come from different backgrounds, and are living in different host cities. Given the 
sensitivity of the data collected, we had to rely on the trust between the enumerator and the 
respondent in order for respondents to honestly share their point of view and to provide referrals 
to other respondents.  
A total of 577 interviews were conducted in Germany and Turkey over a period of three weeks 
in August 2018. In Germany, 241 interviews took place, in Turkey 336. We opted for a short survey 
period to reduce response bias from a changing political environment. Moreover, we explicitly 
chose the summer holiday period for the surveys to further reduce the possibility of changing 
political dynamics influencing the responses.  
In Germany the surveys took place in North-Rhine Westphalia which is the most populated 
state in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017) hosting the highest number of Syrian refugees 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018b). Interviews took place in two cities and the adjacent rural area.5 
These locations can be considered representative of the life of Syrian refugees in Germany as the 
refugees themselves do not decide where to live but the German authorities use the so-called EASY 
quota system (in German: ‘Erstverteilung der Asylsuchenden’ – ‘first distribution of asylum 
seekers’) to allocate asylum seekers across the country (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 
2019b). This implies that refugees are allocated in proportion to the local population. Thus, despite 
the limitations in the sampling approach we expect to have a fairly representative sample of Syrian 
refugees in Germany as a result of the EASY quota system. Data collection in Germany was 
conducted by eight Syrian nationals and took 20 days (8–27 August 2018).  
In Turkey, the selection of representative locations was approached differently as there is 
relative freedom for refugees to choose the governorate in which they wish to reside. Syrian 
refugees tend to live in Istanbul and in cities that are close to the Syrian border. According to the 
Turkish Directorate of Immigration, the main cities hosting Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2018 were 
Istanbul (563,963 refugees), Şanlıurfa (469,215 refugees), Hatay (442,091 refugees) and Gaziantep 
(392,998 refugees) (Mülteciler Derneği, 2018). Since the refugees prefer to stay in the Turkish 
governorate which is closest to their Syrian province of origin, we observe the following situation: 
the governorate Hatay mainly hosts Syrians from Idleb, Hamah and Latakia, the governorate 
Gaziantep mainly hosts refugees from Aleppo, and the governorate Şanlıurfa hosts refugees from 
Alraqa and Deir Alzor. Istanbul is the most diverse, although the majority of refugees staying there 
come from Damascus. Based on this locational sorting, surveys were conducted in four Turkish 
cities which account for more than half of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. The data collection in 
Turkey took place between 15 and 27 August 2018 and was conducted by 17 Syrian nationals.5 
 
 
4 The first recruited individual in the sample provides at least one referral which is explored and included in the sample. 
Every newly recruited participant similarly provides referrals until primary data from sufficient individuals are collected. 
5 Due to the sensitivity of the information shared by the refugees we abstain from identifying the names of the cities 




5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table 1. With respect to the intention to 
return to Syria we observe that more than two thirds of the interviewed respondents desire to go 
back to Syria one day. However, if we look at more proximate return scenarios, the intention to 
return dips: fewer than 40 per cent indicate that they want to go back if Syria is as safe as before 
the war and only about one third intends to go back after two years of stay in the host country. 
Note that we deliberately present a scenario that describes Syria as being as safe as before the war, 
i.e. such a situation builds on the assumption that the regime Al-Assad is still in place, a scenario 
that seems not unlikely.6 
There are marked differences in intended return migration between those refugees who stay 
in Germany and those who stay in Turkey (Table 1). Of those respondents in our sample who 
made it to Germany, roughly half indicate that they want to go back to Syria eventually, whereas 
more than 75 per cent of the respondents who stay in Turkey want to go back. Similarly, only 14 
per cent of the refugees who live in Germany want to return if Syria is as safe as before the war, 
compared to half the refugees in Turkey. Only 13 per cent of the Syrian refugees in Germany can 
see themselves going back after two years, but 50 per cent of those in Turkey anticipate returning. 
These differences between Syrian refugees in Germany and Turkey in the intention to migrate back 
to their home country are not only large in size but also statistically significant suggesting that the 
pool of refugees in the two countries is different.  
Turning to the background characteristics, the German sub-sample consists of far fewer 
women, namely only 8 per cent versus 27 per cent in the sub-sample collected in Turkey (Table 1). 
It is therefore not surprising that the German sub-sample includes more household heads – 95 per 
cent versus 50 per cent. Moreover, the German sub-sample also consists of more married 
individuals – 71 per cent versus 58 per cent. The average age of the refugees is roughly three years 
higher in Germany, but in terms of secondary education and vocational training the two sub-
samples are identical, i.e. 36 per cent of the sample have secondary education or vocational training. 
However, there is a difference of almost 10 percentage points in the share of individuals with 
university education between the refugees in Germany and Turkey; Syrian refugees in our Turkish 
sub-sample have a higher education level on average because we purposefully sampled highly 
educated individuals in Turkey expecting that they are most comparable to those who made it to 
Germany. Yet, this resulted in some over-representation of those with university degrees. Next we 
inquired about the duration of stay. The duration of stay is almost six months shorter on average 
for refugees living in Germany. This does not come as a surprise since most refugees do not directly 
arrive in Germany but stop in other countries and then decide to move on. The travel tends to be 
tedious and time-consuming. 
Turning to the economic variables, we observe a similar share of individuals in both host 
countries who classify themselves as being poor prior to the start of the war (Table 1). Yet, refugees 
in Germany report a higher contemporaneous income category on average. The average refugee in 
Germany reports an income between 1,000 and 1,500 EUR a month (category 4) whereas refugees 
in Turkey report an income between 300 and 500 EUR per month (category 2) on average. These 
income differences between refugees in Germany and Turkey are to be expected given the different 
economic situation of the two countries. The costs of escape were more than 8 times higher for 
Syrian refugees who are in Germany compared to those who live in Turkey. From an analysis of 
the qualitative data we deduce that the refugees consider these higher costs for reaching Germany 
as an investment in ‘the future’ and especially the future of their children. In addition, the refuges 
repeatedly pointed out that the physical distance to their home country and the perceived order of 
life in Germany give them an extra sense of security. 
 
6 The return scenarios presented were as follows: 1) Do you and your family consider returning to Syria? 2) If Syria 








Full sample Germany Turkey Differences 
in means  
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. p-value 
Return intentions 
       







Wants to return if Syria is as safe as 
before the war  
0.388  0.141  0.565  0.000 








       







Respondent is household head 0.688  0.954  0.497  0.000 
Respondent is married 0.631  0.705  0.577  0.002 
Age 32.367 9.909 34.170 8.157 31.074 10.824 0.000 
Has secondary education or 
vocational training 
0.362  0.382  0.348  0.409 
Has university education 0.390  0.336  0.429  0.025 
Duration of stay in months in the 
host country 
38.773 14.128 35.436 8.049 41.167 16.823 0.000 
Economic variables 
       
Self-rated economic status before 








Income category in host country 2.853 1.612 4.286 1.270 1.824 0.879 0.000 
Costs of escape from Syria 2157.619 2650.637 4401.129 2622.299 548.435 967.313 0.000 
Feeling of belonging 
       
Does not have assets in Syria 0.331  0.324  0.336  0.751 

















       
Bashar Al-Assad not being 
president 
0.851  0.867  0.839  0.354 
Importance of freedom of speech 3.251 1.248 3.232 1.324 3.265 1.191 0.758 
Importance of freedom of belief 3.253 1.271 3.307 1.340  3.214 1.220 0.388 
Importance of health services 2.997 1.311 3.041 1.417 2.964 1.231 0.486 
Importance of education services 2.939 1.352 2.992 1.472 2.902 1.260 0.431 
Importance of reconstruction  3.009 1.386 2.826 1.523 3.140 1.265 0.007 
Information shock 
       







Positive information about support 








Note: The total number of observations is 577, of which 241 individuals were interviewed in Germany and 336 in 
Turkey. The income categories in the host country are as follows: Category 1 – Less than 300 EUR; Category 2 – 
300–500 EUR; Category 3 – 500–1,000 EUR; Category 4 – 1,000–1,500 EUR; Category 5 – 1,500–2,000 EUR; 
Category 6 – more than 2,000 EUR. Institutional preferences are coded on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 to 4: 
Category 0 – not very important; Category 1 – not important; Category 2 – not sure; Category 3 – important; 
Category 4 – very important.  
 
 
Interestingly, despite the considerable differences, in practical terms and statistically speaking, 
in the socio-demographic characteristics, cost of escape and contemporaneous economic variables 
between Syrian refugees in Germany and Turkey, there are very few differences in their sense of 
belonging, measured along three dimensions (Table 1). First, one third of all respondents across 
both sub-samples have no assets left in Syria. While this variable can also be considered an 
economic variable, we argue that it similarly proxies for a sense of belonging. Individuals with no 
assets in Syria are more likely to have cut all ties. Second, 76 per cent of the interviewees indicate 
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that they have family in the respective host country; and third, 18 per cent report that they do not 
feel welcome in the host country. Since preferences and ratings are ‘soft’ variables that are 
considered context specific and easily manipulated, it is important to emphasize that despite the 
cultural and economic differences between the two host countries, there are no statistically 
significant differences in the perception of being unwelcome or any other subjective perception 
rating. Similar to the sense of belonging, institutional preferences are practically and statistically 
identical across refugees in both host countries. The vast majority of the refugees – 85 per cent – 
are afraid of the Syrian regime and desire the end of the Al-Assad era. There is a clear preference 
for the democratic value of freedom of speech, on average the refugees indicate to find it important 
(average response of 3.25 on a 0-4 Likert scale). Freedom of belief is valued equally highly (3.25 on 
a 0-4 scale). Notably, more tangible institutions such as health and education services rate slightly 
lower in importance compared to freedom of speech and belief. On average health services have 
an importance rating of 3.00 out of 4 and education services of 2.94 out of 4. There is only one 
difference in the institutional importance ratings between Syrian refugees in Turkey and Germany. 
Refugees in Turkey give more importance to reconstruction of their country. In practical terms 
this latter difference amounts to less than one third of a point on a five-point Likert scale. Notably, 
the other five institutional ratings are identical across host countries. 
Lastly, we implemented a survey experiment on the influence of information on re-migration 
decisions. We randomly divided the refugees into three groups and presented them with a positive, 
a negative or no information about Syria and relocation support. The experiment was carried out 
after the background information about the socio-demographic and economic characteristics were 
collected, and prior to survey questions asking about the intention to migrate back. We randomly 
exposed one out of three respondents to a negative news item about Syria in the form of a video 
clip. The video lasted 2.7 minutes and was issued by Aljazeera news channel in Arabic. The negative 
news item presented latest facts about the numerous challenges that Syrian refugees who returned 
home from Lebanon are facing. The second group of respondents received a positive information 
shock about possible support for returnees. We put together a one-page leaflet with positive and 
encouraging information on support for returnees, including relevant links and addresses in case 
of interest.7 The remaining one third of the respondents served as a control group. We deliberately 
presented powerful images and messages that are directly related to return migration to assess 
whether the new information affected the refugees’ return migration intentions. We aimed at 
resembling the type of rapid information that comes in through social media. Yet, contrary to most 
social media we only shared the content once and not repeatedly. The experiment was designed 
such that the first interviewee of every enumerator entered the control group (receiving no 
information), the second interviewee was exposed to the negative treatment, and the third one 
received the positive treatment. As the descriptive statistics indicate, the information experiment 
was equally implemented across countries. Moreover, we assessed balancing of the treatment across 
socio-demographic and economic characteristics for the sample as a whole and the country sub-
samples. Detailed balancing statistics can be found in the Appendix (Table A1). By and large the 
information treatment is well-balanced across socio-demographic and economic characteristics and 
sub-samples, but we find an imbalance for gender and age. Details are discussed in the Appendix. 
Overall the experiment can be considered as truly randomly implemented along the predetermined 
variables since of the 30 possible comparisons in the overall sample only three are statistically 
significant, for the German sub-sample only one out of 30 is statistically significant and for the 
Turkish sub-sample five out of 30 are statistically significant (three at the 10 per cent level). We do 
not present balancing statistics for the sense of belonging and the institutional preferences as we 
expect that, in addition to the outcome variables (return migration intentions), they are also affected 
 
7 Full details and the material used in the information experiment are available from the authors upon request. 
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by the information treatment. Importantly, we collected all these data after the information 
treatment. 
 
6 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our empirical strategy aims at identifying the correlates of intended return migration. In addition, 
we want to determine the extent to which these correlates are host country specific. We proxy the 
theoretically identified optimal duration of stay with the intent to return. We have three different 
variables depicting (i) the intent to ever return, (ii) the intent to return when it is as safe in Syria as 
before the war, and (iii) the intent to return within two years, i.e. in the near future. In addition to 
socio-demographic control variables we include the presented economic variables, preference 
parameters and measures of institutional quality as motivated by the theoretical model. Finally, we 
assess the role of the information experiment since host-country governments compete with 
dubious news channels, social media and country of origin sources in communicating with refugees 
and it is of interest to host-country institutions to understand how sensitive refugees are to new 
information. The resulting empirical model can be presented as follows: 
 
𝑅 =  𝑋𝑆
′  𝛽𝑆 + 𝑋𝐸
′  𝛽𝐸 +  𝑋𝑃
′  𝛽𝑃 +  𝑋𝐼
′ 𝛽𝐼 +  𝑋𝑁
′  𝛽𝑁 + 𝜆𝐺 +  𝜆𝐴 +  𝜆𝐸𝑛𝑢𝑚 +  𝜀 8 
 
The outcome 𝑅 is binary, with 1 indicating that an individual intends to return and 0 otherwise. 
The matrix of socio-demographic control variables 𝑋𝑆 includes age along with dummy variables 
for female respondents, household heads, married individuals, individuals with secondary 
education or vocational training, and individuals with university education. The duration of stay in 
the host country is included in logarithmic form. The matrix of economic variables 𝑋𝐸 includes a 
dummy variable for those who self-classify as having been poor prior to the war, dummy variables 
for the income category the refugees belong to in the host country and the costs of escape, the 
latter in logarithmic form. The matrix of preference parameters 𝑋𝑃 includes the following dummy 
variables: an indicator for (i) respondents who have family members in the host country, (ii) the 
perception of not feeling welcome in the host country, and (iii) assets in Syria. Note that we include 
a dummy variable coding 1 for those who do not have assets in Syria. Next we include a series of 
institutional variables collected in the matrix 𝑋𝐼. First, we include a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 if the respondent prefers that Bashar Al-Assad is not president anymore. Next, we include a series 
of institutional preference variables. For all these variables we give a preference scale from 0 to 4 
with 0 indicating no importance being given and 4 indicating very high importance or support. 
Indifference is denoted by 2. These variables include the importance of freedom of speech for the 
respondent, the importance of freedom of religion, the importance of free and functioning health 
services as well as of free and functioning education services, and finally the importance of 
reconstruction having started in Syria. Finally, we assess the respondents’ sensitivity to new 
information with the information experiment that randomly provides negative, positive or no 
information. The variables are collected in the matrix 𝑋𝑁. The experiment allows us to empirically 
assess to what extent news feeds affect return intentions. 
To account for structural aspects associated with coming from the same background and living 
together in the same refugee accommodation, we employ governorate of origin specific effects 𝜆𝐺 
as well as accommodation specific effects 𝜆𝐴 . In addition, we account for enumerator specific 
effects 𝜆𝐸𝑛𝑢𝑚 . Although we have carefully trained the enumerators, we want to eliminate any 
remaining systematic bias stemming from the way an enumerator might have asked the questions 
 
8 Since all variables are individual specific except for the fixed effects, we abstain from including individual specific 
identifiers in the regression model. 
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or the interview atmosphere an enumerator might have generated. We cluster the remaining error 
term 𝜀 at the enumerator level. Since this results in only 25 clusters, we also apply cluster wild 
bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. 
Most importantly, the above model includes an interaction term for every control variable. We 
interact every control variable with being a refugee in Turkey. Since the descriptive statistics have 
already indicated that refugees in Germany and Turkey are different along the socio-demographic 
and economic dimension, we want to contrast the determinants and motives for return migration 
for the refugees in both host countries. We opt for a joint model for efficiency. 
Although our outcome variables are binary, we decided to employ the linear probability model 
as main specification. Since the respondents come from 10 different governorates, were sampled 
from seven different locations (two cities and one adjacent rural area in Germany and four cities 
in Turkey) and interviewed by 25 different enumerators, we include a considerable number of linear 
fixed effects given the relatively small sample of 577 observations. We do not want to run the risk 
of an incidental parameters problem and abstain from implementing non-linear models (Lancaster, 




Before starting with the discussion of the multivariate results, we will highlight some observations 
about the nature of our outcome variables. First and foremost, the descriptive statistics already 
indicate that the three presented return scenarios are not only different in nature but also perceived 
differently. There is no doubt that the majority of the refugees plans to return eventually (67%, 
compare Table 1). But when it comes to concrete time horizons or a situation that is presented as 
safe but with the caveat that it is only ‘as safe as before the war’ the refugees are less inclined to 
consider return migration. The differences in the three scenarios are also reflected in the correlation 
across the intended return migration scenarios. The strength of the correlation is only moderate, 
between 0.33 and 0.36. Yet, all the correlations are highly statistically significant (p-value<0.001). 
Thus, there is no doubt that the concept of return migration is understood across scenarios but 
put in perspective given the presented conditions.  
The host country dynamics differ across return scenarios. The correlation between the 
intention to eventually go back and the other two re-migration indicators is relatively small among 
Syrian refugees in Germany. In turn, for refugees in Turkey the correlation in return scenarios is 
highest for eventual return and re-migration if Syria is safe as before the war. This suggests that 
returning home is more closely linked to an end of the fighting for refugees staying in Turkey. 
Hence, the descriptive statistic in combination with these basic correlation dynamics indicate a 
sorting of refugees into host countries depending on intended duration of stay. Detailed correlation 
results are presented in the Appendix (Table A2). 
 
7.1 Main Results: Multivariate Analysis 
The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 2. Six findings stand out that hold 
independent of the presented return migration scenario. First, despite considerable differences in 
the socio-demographic and economic characteristics between the refugees in Germany and Turkey, 
these characteristics tend to have limited predictive power for re-migration intentions, suggesting 
that return migration intentions are not very much influenced by background characteristics. 
Second, refugees in Germany who do not have any assets in Syria are less likely to indicate that 
they want to return to their country of origin, suggesting that they have cut all their ties. This 
finding holds across all models that we estimate and even when we apply cluster wild 
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bootstrapping. Third, democratic rights that are very much emphasized by Western governments 
and NGOs in the process of reconstruction and repatriation do not seem to feed into the return 
migration decision. Although the refugees attribute a high value to freedom of speech and freedom 
of belief (Table 1), these preferences are not coherently or strongly associated with the return 
migration decision independent of where the refugees are hosted. Fourth, Syrian refugees who 
place a high value on education seem to have opted for seeking refuge in Germany; the more 
importance they attach to education, the less likely they are to want to migrate back. Fifth, theory 
suggests that over time return migration becomes more likely. However, we do not identify a 
relationship between re-migration intentions and duration of stay in two of the three scenarios. 
This might be linked to the relative short time of staying in the host countries and the fact that at 
the time of the interviews the war in Syria was still ongoing with unclear outcome. Duration of stay 
is only linked to the intention of going back if Syria is as safe as before the war. Sixth, the 
information treatment does not systematically influence the decision to migrate back. The lack of 
a reaction to the shared information demonstrates how intricate it is for host-country governments 
to reach out to the refugees even with useful support messages such as the presented leaflet. The 
new information does not seem to affect the refugees’ return migration intentions although we 
deliberately opted for strong messages directly related to return migration. 
Next we turn to a detailed discussion of the findings. Column 1 of Table 2 presents the 
correlates of intended return migration at some point in time (‘return ever’). First, we observe that 
there are differences in the socio-demographic correlates between those refugees staying in 
Germany and those in Turkey. Female respondents interviewed in Turkey are 33 per cent less likely 
to have intentions for return migration compared to men. However, this effect disappears once we 
apply the wild bootstrapping. While we do not identify any gender dynamics for the sub-sample of 
refugees in Germany, we observe that married refugees who stay in Germany are 19 per cent more 
likely to have re-migration intentions compared to married individuals in Turkey. Again, however, 
the effect disappears with bootstrapping. In turn, we find a statistically stable age effect suggesting 
that older refugees who stay in Germany are more likely to have the wish to go back to Syria 
compared to younger refugees in Germany. This is in line with the existing literature about return 
migration (Kirdar, 2009; Constant and Massey, 2003). We further learned from the qualitative 
interviews that this finding is linked to cultural differences between Germany and Syria. The 
differences are perceived as being considerable and there is a desire to be closer to home when old. 
We observe contrasting age dynamics for refugees in Turkey. The younger respondents are more 
likely to express the desire to go back.  While older refugees perceive Turkey as a safe haven that 
is close to home, the younger ones indicated that they see more opportunities back in Syria. In 
turn, we find that refugees with university education who stay in Turkey are considerably less likely 
(27 per cent) to intend going back home. However, this finding also disappears when we bootstrap. 
In short, the socio-demographic factors could not be identified as strong predictors for return 
migration decisions. 
Turning to the economic variables, those refugees staying in Germany who have a higher 
income have a lower probability of re-migration.9 Meanwhile, the costs of escape are positively and 
statistically significantly associated with return to Syria for those refugees staying in Germany but 
negatively for those staying in Turkey.  
Next we assess the variables that code for the sense of belonging, which proxy for the 
parameter B(.) from our theoretical model. The first variable that we analyse is also an economic 
variable, namely whether an individual has assets in Syria. Not having assets in Syria decreases the 
probability of return migration among refugees in Germany by 20 per cent, suggesting that those 
individuals derive a comparably low benefit from consumption back home. Lack of asset 
ownership has no effect for refugees in Turkey. Another variable feeding into a sense of belonging 
is the presence of family members in the host country. Having family members in Germany 
(Turkey) reduces (increases) the probability of return migration by 24 per cent (37 per cent). We 
 
9 Note that we pool all sources of income including remittances and social assistance. 
16 
 
can only speculate about the increased likelihood of return migration in the case of Turkey: we 
have some indicative evidence from the qualitative interviews that due to the proximity between 
Turkey and Syria, refugees with family members in Turkey consider the country a safe haven to 
which they can always turn if needed. Lastly, whether the refugees feel welcome or not does not 




Main Results: Return Migration Intentions and their Correlates 
 Return ever 
Return after two 
years 
Return if Syria is 
as safe as 
before the war 
Socio-demographic variables    
Respondent is female 0.277 0.021 -0.101   
 (0.189) (0.058) (0.069)   
Tx(Respondent is female) -0.333* -0.015 0.077   
 (0.195) (0.111) (0.095)   
Household head -0.245 0.053 -0.387**  
 (0.159) (0.093) (0.177)   
Tx(Household head) 0.280 -0.009 0.397**  
 (0.181) (0.108) (0.189)   
Age 0.011** -0.002 0.000   
 (0.005) [0.074] (0.004) (0.002)   
Tx(Age) -0.014** 0.005 -0.000   
 (0.005) [0.024] (0.007) (0.004)   
Married 0.187* -0.067 -0.010   
 (0.095) (0.042) (0.048)   
Tx(Married) -0.142 0.006 0.098   
 (0.118) (0.085) (0.092)   
Secondary/vocational education -0.015 -0.017 -0.085   
 (0.057) (0.066) (0.054)   
Tx(Secondary/vocational education) -0.066 -0.191 0.130   
 (0.093) (0.118) (0.098)   
University education 0.118 0.007 -0.050   
 (0.107) (0.064) (0.121)   
Tx(University education) -0.272** -0.294** -0.014   
 (0.130) (0.132) [0.084] (0.145)   
Duration of stay (log) -0.011 -0.129 -0.170*** 
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.059) [0.002] 
Tx(Duration of stay) 0.011 0.092 0.184**  
 (0.123) (0.110) (0.086) [0.052] 
Economic variables    
Self-rated poor 0.079 -0.114* -0.128   
 (0.051) (0.061) (0.111)   
Tx(Self-rated poor) 0.050 0.135 0.154   
 (0.089) (0.136) (0.127)   
Income category host country  -0.051** 0.016 0.007   
 (0.020) [0.010] (0.022) (0.022)   
Tx(Income category host country) 0.018 -0.031 -0.073*  
 (0.032) (0.047) (0.036) [0.088] 
Costs of escape (log) 0.036*** 0.012 -0.004   
 (0.008) [0.000] (0.007) (0.005)   
Tx(Costs of escape) -0.048** -0.041* 0.020   
 (0.023) [0.056] (0.024)  (0.022)   
Feeling of belonging    
No assets in Syria -0.204*** -0.075* -0.147*** 
 (0.058) [0.036] (0.037) [0.098] (0.044) [0.002] 
Tx(No assets in Syria) 0.057 -0.009 0.064   
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.083)   
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Family members in host country -0.239** 0.002 -0.105   
 (0.104) [0.054] (0.081) (0.068)   
Tx(Family members in host country) 0.366*** -0.092 0.037   
 (0.115) [0.002] (0.108) (0.108)   
Does not feel welcome in host country -0.025 0.112*** 0.104*  
 (0.055) (0.037)  (0.059)  
Tx(Does not feel welcome in host country) -0.067 -0.050 -0.178**  
 (0.070) (0.077) (0.079) [0.044] 
Institutional preferences    
Important: Freedom of speech -0.035 0.027 0.022   
 (0.087) (0.017) [0.054] (0.021)   
Tx(Important: Freedom of speech) 0.042 -0.038 -0.056   
 (0.100) (0.044) (0.041)   
Important: Freedom of belief -0.003 -0.037 -0.014   
 (0.072) (0.041) (0.018)   
Tx(Important: Freedom of belief) 0.045 0.076 0.051*  
 (0.089) (0.052) (0.029) [0.068] 
Important: Health services 0.098 0.087* 0.049   
 (0.069) (0.046) (0.060)   
Tx(Important: Health services) -0.097 -0.095 0.002   
 (0.077) (0.062) (0.070)   
Important: Education services -0.126** -0.082* -0.073*  
 (0.059) [0.004] (0.042) [0.060] (0.035) [0.086] 
Tx(Important: Education services) 0.102 0.109** 0.091*  
 (0.064) (0.052) (0.052) [0.100] 
Important: Reconstruction 0.048*** 0.031 0.043   
 (0.012) [0.000] (0.034) (0.036)   
Tx(Important: Reconstruction) 0.013 -0.056 -0.030   
 (0.026) (0.056) (0.049)   
Bashar Al-Assad not being president 0.212** 0.044 0.078*  
 (0.087) (0.051) (0.045)   
Tx(Bashar Al-Assad not being president) -0.111 0.090 0.082   
 (0.110) (0.121) (0.086)   
Information shock    
Negative information 0.027 0.046 0.044   
 (0.036) (0.063) (0.031)   
Tx(Negative information) -0.096 -0.135 -0.146*** 
 (0.071) (0.084) (0.040) [0.002] 
Positive information 0.001 0.028 -0.024   
 (0.053) (0.064) (0.040)   
Tx(Positive information) -0.054 -0.131 -0.074   
 (0.074) (0.079) (0.068)   
Note: Results derived from a linear probability model with governorate of origin, host-country accommodation 
and enumerator specific effects. The total number of observations is 577. Standard errors clustered at the 
enumerator level are presented in parentheses; p-values resulting from the cluster wild bootstrap procedure 
with 1,000 replications are presented in brackets next to the clustered standard errors whenever the wild 
bootstrapped p-value is ≤ 10%. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level. The interaction term for 
respondents from Turkey is indicted by ‘Tx(.)’. 
 
 
Institutional preferences as theoretically modelled by Ii (with i=h, o) are fairly weak predictors of 
eventual intended return. Neither freedom of speech nor freedom of belief nor access to free and 
functioning health services are linked to re-migration considerations. Put differently, the refugees 
derive limited utility from democratic liberties. However, those refugees who stay in Germany and 
value education are 13 per cent less likely to have return migration intentions. The role of education 
was stressed throughout the interviews. In Table 3, Panel A we present a small collection of direct 
quotes showing that from the point of view of the refugees staying in Germany is associated with 
better education and a better future for their children. While reconstruction within Syria has a 
positive impact on the re-migration intentions of refugees in Germany, it only increases the 
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probability of re-migration by 5 per cent, suggesting that there is limited trust that reconstruction 
will happen. This lack of trust in change is further related to the current Syrian regime. Since in the 
interviews the refugees referred frequently to the regime and the role of President Al-Assad (Table 
3, Panel B) we also assessed whether his presidency has an impact on intended return migration. 
Many interviewees explicitly talked about ‘the regime’, fear of it and return in case the regime falls. 
This also shows quantitatively. For the German sub-sample we find that if the Al-Assad regime 
were to come to an end, intended return migration would increase by 21 per cent. Taken together, 
the empirical findings about institutional preferences support their inclusion in the theoretical 
model. Yet, the findings highlight that it is only the most tangible institutions that feed into return 
migration intention. 
Finally, as already discussed, the information treatment does not affect intended return 
migration. We consider the information treatment as shifter of the preference B(.) for consumption 
at home and expect that a positive (negative) information shock τInfo>1 (τInfo<1) increases (decreases) 
that preference. In the case of eventual return migration, it is not surprising to find no impact since 
the information we presented contains facts that are immediately relevant and mainly aimed at 





Panel A: Statements about education and a better future for the children 
‘The problem is the absence of security in Syria because of the regime and militia affiliated with it. I took my 
children to Jordan and then brought them to Germany to protect them and to get them a better future. It is not 
for me’ (45-year-old man in Germany).  
‘If I wanted to return, I would not have sold my house, which was all that I had in Syria. … The problem is not 
only about the war ending. There are other matters negatively influencing whether I want to return: crime, the 
future of my children …’ (32-year-old man in Germany). 
‘Whether Syria is safe or not, I do not want to return. I lost years of my life and do not have a future. … But if it 
is up to me, I will stay here to continue what I already started. I will finish my studies and get a university degree 
in Germany’ (27-year-old man in Germany). 
‘[In Germany] there is someone to help me build their [the children’s] future. This forces me to stay and not 
think about return whatever I will be offered’ (42-year-old man in Germany). 
Panel B: Statements about the Syrian regime 
‘We want a free Syria in which we live a safe and dignified life and have the full freedoms that the people deserve, 
without the regime of Bashar Al Assad and his intelligence gangs’ (35-year-old man in Turkey).  
‘It is most important to live without the feeling that you are owned by a government or by anybody’ (32-year-old 
man in Germany). 
‘I do not want to return because of the Assad Regime. I was arrested, my brother died under torture. How can I 
go back as long as the regime still exists there?’ (28-year-old man in Germany). 
‘I will not return unless the regime of Assad falls and all armed groups are dismantled …’ (23-year-old man in 
Turkey). 
‘Because I want to return only in the event of the fall of the regime, which means if the war ends. But if the regime 
does not fall, I do not want to return’ (32-year-old woman in Turkey). 
Note: italics added by the authors. 
 
 
Next we assess the scenario of return after a stay of two years in the host country. This scenario is 
least predictable with the characteristics that we analyse. Except for university education, none of 
the socio-demographic variables has predictive power. Syrian refugees with university education 
who stay in Turkey are about 29 per cent less likely to indicate that they want to return after two 
years. Again, the duration of stay in the host country does not affect intended return after two 
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years. We find some moderate indication reinforcing the negative effect of the costs of escape for 
refugees in Turkey. The effect is similar as for the outcome ‘return ever’ but less precisely estimated.  
In addition, we observe that for the short-term scenario of return after a stay of two years, the 
sense of not feeling welcome reinforces the desire to go back to Syria for refugees in Germany by 
11 per cent. But even this effect is not stable, and disappears with wild bootstrapping. One effect 
that is coherently statistically significant across models is that refugees in Germany who did not 
keep any assets in Syria are less likely to express the intention to go back home after two years (7.5 
per cent). The role of education services is similarly coherently significant. Refugees in Germany 
who value education are 8 per cent less likely to report that they want to return to Syria after two 
years of stay. Lastly, although refugees who consider return to Syria in the short term should in 
theory be susceptible to new information, we do not find any reaction to our information 
treatment. 
The third scenario under study is that of return to Syria if the country is as safe as before the 
war. As outlined above, we deliberately present this scenario that includes the continuation of the 
regime Al-Assad. Again, we observe hardly any relationship between the socio-demographic 
characteristics and the intention to migrate back. Syrian household heads in Germany appear to be 
less likely to want to go back compared to household heads in Turkey. However, this result does 
not hold when we employ wild bootstrapping for standard errors. What we do find is that the 
duration of stay in the host country is related to the intention of going back to Syria if it is as safe 
as before the war. The longer the refugees are in Germany, the lower the probability becomes that 
returning to a Syria that is as safe as before the war is an option. In contrast, the longer the refugees 
stay in Turkey, the bigger the probability that they consider going back if Syria is as safe as before 
the war, indicating that assimilation patterns are different in Germany and Turkey. Similar to return 
intentions after two years, those refugees who live in Germany and do not feel welcome are 10 per 
cent more likely to consider returning if Syria is as safe as before the war. However, this result 
disappears with wild bootstrapping. In turn, refugees in Turkey who do not feel welcome are 18 
per cent less likely to want to go back. In short, the results about feeling welcome are neither 
systematic nor stable across outcomes. Therefore, we treat them with caution. What is stable across 
return scenarios is the observation that refugees in Germany who lost all their belongings or sold 
everything back home in Syria are 15 per cent less likely to have the intention of re-migration if 
Syria is as safe as before the war. This is in line with the findings associated with the other two 
return migration outcomes. Also similar to the other two migration outcomes is the finding that 
refugees in Germany who value education are 7 per cent less likely to intend going back to a Syria 
that is as safe as before the war. This result shows up coherently across specifications, even when 
we employ wild bootstrapping. Finally, the negative information treatment is significant for 
refugees in Turkey when it comes to the concept of returning to a Syria that is as safe as before the 
war (15 per cent). This finding suggests that for those who stay close to home and consider going 
back even if the regime is still in place, new information about the cruelties of the regime is likely 
to make them rethink. The finding also highlights that for the information treatments under study 
to be successful requires very specific setup and conditions. Only very well-tailored negative 
information appears to have an impact on those most affected. Consequently, if similar impacts 
are to be achieved with positive and supportive information, that information needs to be 
extremely pertinent for the target group. 
To sum up, in relation to our theoretical considerations we find support for three factors. 
First, the sense of belonging (B(.)) matters for return migration intentions. Second, tangible 
institutions (Ii, with i=h, o) also affect intended return whereas more abstract institutional concepts 
do not. Third, on the spot information (τInfo) has limited impact on the desire for consumption at 





7.2 Robustness Checks 
To gauge the robustness of our findings we also estimate the three models step-wise. We first 
include only the socio-demographic controls, then we add the economic variables, and so on. We 
observe parameter stability across models. Detailed results are presented in the Appendix in Tables 
A3 to A5. In addition, we estimate a logit model although our specification includes many fixed 
effects and many dummy variables relative to the sample size. The results from the logistic 
regressions are presented in the Appendix in Table A6. Results are qualitatively similar, reinforcing 
our main findings, but the coefficient estimates tend to be bigger in absolute size and inference is 
less conservative even when applying multi-way clustering. Therefore, we prefer the conservative 
estimates from the linear probability model. 
Finally, we estimate a model that contains only the predetermined control variables and the 
fixed effects along with the information experiment. This model is estimated to assess whether the 
lack of impact from the survey experiment on the outcome variables is driven by the impact the 
information treatment has on the sense of belonging and the institutional preferences. Results are 
presented in the Appendix in Table A7. Again, we find no support for the information treatment 
systematically affecting return migration intentions. At first sight it seems that the negative 
information treatment has an effect on refugees in Turkey and their short-term return migration 
intentions but when we apply wild bootstrapping the effect disappears for the return migration 
intention after two years. Similar to the full model, the only effect that persists is the negative 
information effect for refugees in Turkey who intend to go back if Syria is as safe as before the 
war. Thus, at most we can conclude that the refugees who consider going back home in the near 
future are susceptible to unknown negative news. Such negative news makes the refugees rethink 
their re-migration intentions as the likelihood of going back to Syria decreases by 15 per cent as a 
consequence of the video. Beyond this limited impact of the negative information treatment we do 
not see that information provided on the spot, in particular support information, has an influence 
on decision making about return. 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
Understanding decision making about return migration, particularly in the case of refugees, is not 
an easy task but for that very reason it is important to provide informed, data-driven information 
from the refugees themselves to host-country policy makers. We focus on Syrian refugees since 
the Syrian civil war is considered the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time. While we 
are aware that Syria is still at war, host-country governments face a lot of domestic pressure to 
provide long-term solutions for the Syrian refugees. The discourse of the alleged threat that 
refugees pose to host communities is used by right-wing populist parties to win votes by 
playing on insecurity and fear (Holmes and Castaneda, 2016). Moreover, since mid-2019 the 
most violent war activities in Syria have ceased and, according to the UNHCR, by the end of 
August 2019 almost 200,000 Syrian refugees had self-organized their return (UNHCR, 2019b). 
Consequently, foreign governments as well as international institutions are starting to think ahead 
and assess whether in the not-so-distant future Syrian refugees will be able to safely and voluntarily 
return home.  
This research presents a first quantitative attempt to disentangle the individual-level factors 
associated with the possible return migration of Syrian refugees. We contrast Syrian refugees 
staying in a highly developed, distant country, i.e. Germany, with those in the neighbouring country 
that accepted most refugees, i.e. Turkey. Next to individual-level correlates of intended return 
migration we examined the impact of new information on the return decision by randomly 
exposing respondents to a video containing negative information or a leaflet with positive 
information about returning. Our results are as follows: refugees in neighbouring countries like 
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Turkey are more likely to indicate their willingness to return compared to those in Germany, 
suggesting that the greater distance of Germany and the perceived order of life not only gives an 
immediate sense of security and structure but more importantly stability for the future. Even when 
asked about eventual return at some point in the future, 45 per cent of the respondents in Germany 
and 24 per cent of the respondents in Turkey state that they never want to go back. In addition, 
host governments should not underestimate the role of Assad’s Government for return migration 
intentions. For the majority of the refugees, eventual return is linked to an end of the regime. Thus, 
neither proximate nor distant host countries should bank on the speedy return of the Syrian 
refugees but should focus on integrating them, independently of how long they intend to stay.  
In terms of predictors of re-migration intentions, we conclude the following: despite 
considerable differences in the socio-demographic and economic characteristics between the 
refugees in Germany and Turkey, these characteristics tend to have limited predictive power for 
re-migration intentions, suggesting that return migration intentions are not substantially influenced 
by background characteristics. Next, we observe that refugees in Germany who do not have any 
assets left in Syria are less likely to have re-migration intentions. Although refugees value 
democratic rights, liberties such as freedom of speech do not feed into the return migration 
decision, independent of where the refugees are hosted. Syrian refugees who place a high value on 
education seem to have opted for seeking refuge in Germany, and the degree of importance they 
attach to education has an inverse relation to the likelihood that they will want to migrate back. 
The randomly introduced information treatment does not systematically influence the decision to 
migrate back. The lack of a reaction to the presented information demonstrates how challenging it 
is for host governments to reach out to the refugees even with support messages. 
We do not want to conclude without acknowledging that this research suffers from several 
limitations that have to be taken into consideration when assessing the findings. First, we could 
not employ random sampling. We addressed this challenge as follows: we aimed to obtain as 
representative a sample as possible by relying on a fairly large number of enumerators with different 
circles of influence and by ensuring that we interviewed refugees from different governorates of 
origin and at different host locations. Second, we deliberately reached out mainly to household 
heads and, given the structure of Syrian families, household heads tend to be men. They make far-
reaching decisions such as return migration. As a consequence, in particular our German sub-
sample has very few female respondents. Therefore, we do not want to draw any conclusions about 
gender dynamics. Third, ideally we would have observed returned refugees, allowing us to assess 
the average duration of stay instead of stated intentions under different scenarios. However, in 
mid-2018 Syria was still in a state of war and for host countries that allowed many refugees to enter, 
such as Germany and Turkey, a key question is what makes refugees want to stay or want to go 
home and not realized decisions. Thus, by presenting different return scenarios we can get fairly 
close to obtaining an answer to one of the most pressing questions of host-country governments 
which are in need of informed advice now and not retrospectively. Fourth, we would have liked to 
analyse more complex return migration scenarios. In our survey, we presented the respondents 
with scenarios that offer financial support for repatriation, but found that the refugees were not 
responsive to different levels of financial support. Those who indicated from the start that they 
were not interested in repatriation could not be convinced by increasing financial incentives to 
change their stated intention and those who wanted to relocate wanted to do so independent of 
the financial support provided for starting a new life back home. Given this inelastic response to 
the presented return scenarios, we had to carry out our analysis employing binary indicators. Fifth, 
from an econometric point of view we would have liked to include more objective measures of 
institutional quality. However, such measures are not available at a disaggregated level and it is not 
very likely that a slight change in a good governance index between any two years of war would 
make refugees revise their view on local institutions. It is rather the refugees’ own perceptions and 
the subjective experiences they have lived through and shared with others that influence their 
decision making about return.  
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What, then, have we learned? If large-scale return migration is desired, we should try to better 
understand the preferences and concerns of the refugees. Consequently, we would do well to listen 
to the voices of the refugees themselves since they have very clear ideas about what would make 
returning worth the effort. By understanding the decision-making process of refugees, host-
country governments will be able to reach out to them and communicate with them more 
effectively. Host-country governments should take the time to engage with the refugees and base 
policy decisions on micro-level evidence instead of viewing refugees as one big, homogeneous 
group (Al-Rasheed, 1994). The situation in Syria continues to be unstable and it remains to be seen 
whether the country can find a way back to peace in the near future. As our data show, the end of 
the war and even political change will not be enough for all refugees to consider returning. 
Consequently, host countries might as well invest in the integration of those refugees who are 
willing to assimilate. Taking the stance that the presence of the Syrian refugees is entirely temporary 
is not what the data suggest. 
Finally, to better understand the refugees’ perspective, future research should assess their 
preferences and aspirations in more detail and examine how these might change with the duration 
of stay and the experiences accumulated in the host country. Such research could feed into 
decisions about the type and scope of effective integration as well as repatriation programmes. 
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Full sample       
Gender: Female 0.232 0.149 0.172 0.035** 0.146 0.561 
Age 33.323 32.766 30.680 0.576 0.009*** 0.042** 
Respondent is household head 0.682 0.723 0.657 0.362 0.604 0.175 
Respondent is married 0.650 0.638 0.598 0.806 0.291 0.431 
Duration of stay in the host 
country in months 
3.647 3.582 3.592 0.116 0.179 0.840 
Has secondary education or 
vocational training 
0.382 0.335 0.367 0.328 0.763 0.531 
Has university education 0.400 0.362 0.408 0.429 0.869 0.368 
Self-rated economic status: Poor  0.068 0.112 0.071 0.123 0.914 0.186 
Income category in host country 2.859 2.899 2.793 0.805 0.682 0.543 
Costs of escape from Syria 6.282 6.585 6.370 0.149 0.692 0.346 
       
Germany       
Gender: Female 0.114 0.036 0.086 0.057* 0.566 0.197 
Age 33.182 35.072 34.343 0.107 0.381 0.602 
Respondent is household head 0.955 0.940 0.971 0.667 0.584 0.354 
Respondent is married 0.682 0.711 0.729 0.682 0.526 0.810 
Duration of stay in the host 
country in months 
3.581 3.575 3.550 0.867 0.406 0.493 
Has secondary education or 
vocational training 
0.409 0.361 0.371 0.525 0.633 0.899 
Has university education 0.398 0.301 0.300 0.188 0.205 0.987 
Self-rated economic status: Poor  0.057 0.096 0.071 0.332 0.710 0.584 
Income category in host country 4.284 4.313 4.257 0.885 0.890 0.788 
Costs of escape from Syria 8.130 7.875 7.779 0.257 0.182 0.761 
       
Turkey       
Gender: Female 0.311 0.238 0.232 0.218 0.190 0.923 
Age 33.417 30.943 28.091 0.096* 0.000*** 0.039** 
Respondent is household head 0.500 0.552 0.434 0.425 0.325 0.093* 
Respondent is married 0.629 0.581 0.505 0.456 0.060* 0.279 
Duration of stay in the host 
country in months 
3.691 3.588 3.621 0.118 0.277 0.658 
Has secondary education or 
vocational training 
0.364 0.314 0.364 0.428 1.000 0.459 
Has university education 0.402 0.410 0.485 0.901 0.208 0.282 
Self-rated economic status: Poor  0.076 0.124 0.071 0.216 0.885 0.204 
Income category in host country 1.909 1.781 1.758 0.268 0.196 0.849 
Costs of escape from Syria 5.050 5.565 5.373 0.023 0.150 0.423 
Note: The total number of observations is 577. The German sub-sample consists of 241 and the Turkish sub-
sample of 336 observations. 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
 
 
Discussion of imbalances: There are more women in the control group compared to the treatment 
group receiving negative information: the difference amounts to 8.3 percentage points and is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. In turn, despite being statistically significant, the actual 
age difference across treatment groups is small. Across groups all refugees are in their early 30s on 
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average; the positive treatment group is youngest, i.e. the average respondent is 30.68 years old, 
which makes them 2.64 years younger than the oldest group which received no information, i.e. 
the control group. In the German sub-sample, only the imbalance with respect to gender persists. 
The age imbalance is found in the Turkish sub-sample with the already discussed gap. In addition, 
the Turkish sub-sample exhibits an imbalance for household heads and marital status, both 




Correlation Across Return Migration Outcomes 
 All Germany Turkey 















Wants to return after 2 years 0.328  0.247  0.297  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Wants to return if Syria is safe 0.334 0.369 0.197 0.485 0.328 0.161 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Note: The total number of observations is 577. We have 241 observations for Germany and 336 for Turkey; 
p-values are indicated in parentheses. 
 
 
There are some interesting host-country dynamics. The correlation is strongest for return migration 
after two years and return migration if Syria is safe for Syrian refugees in Germany, suggesting that 
these scenarios evoke similar connotations. At the same time, among the refugees staying in 
Germany, the share of those who want to return eventually is considerably higher (55%) compared 
to those who want to go back if Syria is safe and/or in the short run (14 and 13%, respectively, 
compare Table 1). Thus, it is unsurprising that the correlation between the intention to eventually 
go back and the other two re-migration indicators is relatively small among Syrian refugees in 
Germany. The picture is considerably different for refugees staying in Turkey. The correlation is 
lowest between those who want to go back if Syria is safe and those who want to go back after two 
years. In turn, the correlation is highest between those who want to re-migrate if Syria is safe and 
those who want to return eventually, suggesting that returning home is more closely linked to an 
end of the fighting for refugees staying in Turkey. Hence, the descriptive statistic in combination 
with these basic correlation dynamics already suggest a sorting of refugees into host countries 





Step-wise Setup of the Regression Model for the Outcome ‘Return Ever’ 
 Return ever 
Socio-demographic variables     
Respondent is female 0.220 0.191 0.216 0.268 
 (0.204) (0.205) (0.239) (0.200) 
Tx(Respondent is female) -0.249 -0.217 -0.275 -0.320 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.242) (0.206) 
Household head -0.198 -0.254* -0.261* -0.248 
 (0.128) (0.145) (0.147) (0.158) 
Tx(Household head) 0.234 0.287* 0.262 0.274 
 (0.153) (0.166) (0.168) (0.180) 
Age 0.010* 0.013** 0.010** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Tx(Age) -0.012* -0.015** -0.014*** -0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Married 0.076 0.119 0.181* 0.185* 
 (0.126) (0.115) (0.105) (0.094) 
Tx(Married) -0.002 -0.036 -0.125 -0.137 
 (0.150) (0.142) (0.127) (0.117) 
Duration of stay (log) 0.091 0.054 0.047 -0.007 
 (0.098) (0.092) (0.085) (0.100) 
Tx(Duration of stay) -0.045 -0.043 -0.042 0.008 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.115) (0.127) 
Secondary/vocational education -0.037 -0.050 -0.048 -0.018 
 (0.089) (0.095) (0.082) (0.056) 
Tx(Secondary/vocational education) -0.040 -0.014 -0.003 -0.059 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.116) (0.095) 
University education 0.114 0.113 0.128 0.116 
 (0.127) (0.135) (0.122) (0.110) 
Tx(University education) -0.271* -0.248 -0.249 -0.265* 
 (0.149) (0.156) (0.148) (0.133) 
Economic variables     
Self-rated poor  0.138 0.154* 0.083 
  (0.106) (0.085) (0.052) 
Tx(Self-rated poor)  -0.018 -0.004 0.042 
  (0.119) (0.101) (0.090) 
Income category host country   -0.070*** -0.056*** -0.050** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) 
Tx(Income category host country)  0.070*** 0.044 0.022 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.030) 
Costs of escape (log)  0.038*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Tx(Costs of escape)  -0.059** -0.050* -0.048** 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) 
Feeling of belonging     
Family members in host country   -0.218** -0.240** 
   (0.081) (0.102) 
Tx(Family members in host country)   0.356*** 0.369*** 
   (0.097) (0.113) 
Does not feel welcome in host country   -0.022 -0.024 
   (0.042) (0.054) 
Tx(Does not feel welcome in host country)   -0.111 -0.076 
   (0.065) (0.069) 
No assets in Syria   -0.203** -0.204*** 
   (0.080) (0.059) 
Tx(No assets in Syria)   0.072 0.063 
   (0.094) (0.080) 
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Institutional preferences     
Important: Freedom of speech    -0.036 
    (0.088) 
Tx(Important: Freedom of speech)    0.041 
    (0.101) 
Important: Freedom of belief    -0.003 
    (0.072) 
Tx(Important: Freedom of belief)    0.044 
    (0.089) 
Important: Health services    0.100 
    (0.066) 
Tx(Important: Health services)    -0.099 
    (0.074) 
Important: Education services    -0.128** 
    (0.057) 
Tx(Important: Education services)    0.103 
    (0.063) 
Important: Reconstruction    0.047*** 
    (0.013) 
Tx(Important: Reconstruction)    0.014 
    (0.027) 
Bashar Al-Assad not being president    0.213** 
    (0.085) 
Tx(Bashar Al-Assad not being president)    -0.110 
    (0.110) 
Note: Results derived from a linear probability model with governorate of origin, host-country 
accommodation and enumerator specific effects. The total number of observations is 577. Standard errors 
clustered at the enumerator level are presented in parentheses. 








Step-wise Setup of the Regression Model for the Outcome ‘Return after Two Years’ 
 Return after two years 
Socio-demographic variables     
Respondent is female -0.016 -0.011 -0.024 0.009 
 (0.056) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) 
Tx(Respondent is female) 0.002 -0.002 0.025 0.006 
 (0.111) (0.115) (0.120) (0.116) 
Household head 0.042 0.036 0.025 0.049 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.110) (0.099) 
Tx(Household head) -0.053 -0.047 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.125) (0.111) 
Age 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tx(Age) 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Married -0.024 -0.048 -0.063 -0.066 
 (0.058) (0.069) (0.063) (0.042) 
Tx(Married) -0.041 -0.004 0.027 0.007 
 (0.100) (0.104) (0.101) (0.085) 
Duration of stay (log) -0.078 -0.098 -0.093 -0.130 
 (0.095) (0.092) (0.079) (0.079) 
Tx(Duration of stay) 0.100 0.067 0.077 0.094 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.107) (0.104) 
Secondary/vocational education -0.055 -0.055 -0.044 -0.023 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.057) 
Tx(Secondary/vocational education) -0.121 -0.118 -0.148 -0.181 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.118) 
University education -0.020 -0.026 -0.010 0.001 
 (0.094) (0.084) (0.080) (0.069) 
Tx(University education) -0.236 -0.224 -0.260* -0.285** 
 (0.139) (0.135) (0.133) (0.136) 
Economic variables     
Self-rated poor  -0.099** -0.095** -0.109 
  (0.041) (0.037) (0.065) 
Tx(Self-rated poor)  0.138 0.124 0.125 
  (0.129) (0.125) (0.138) 
Income category host country   0.019 0.018 0.017 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) 
Tx(Income category host country)  -0.016 -0.019 -0.023 
  (0.038) (0.042) (0.046) 
Costs of escape (log)  0.011 0.012* 0.011 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tx(Costs of escape)  -0.043* -0.044* -0.041* 
  (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
Feeling of belonging     
Family members in host country   0.017 0.001 
   (0.069) (0.079) 
Tx(Family members in host country)   -0.102 -0.090 
   (0.097) (0.105) 
Does not feel welcome in host country   0.112*** 0.114*** 
   (0.028) (0.037) 
Tx(Does not feel welcome in host country)   -0.055 -0.057 
   (0.071) (0.077) 
No assets in Syria   -0.046* -0.071** 
   (0.024) (0.034) 
Tx(No assets in Syria)   -0.007 -0.001 
   (0.080) (0.084) 
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Institutional preferences     
Important: Freedom of speech    0.028 
    (0.020) 
Tx(Important: Freedom of speech)    -0.040 
    (0.043) 
Important: Freedom of belief    -0.037 
    (0.042) 
Tx(Important: Freedom of belief)    0.074 
    (0.052) 
Important: Health services    0.090** 
    (0.043) 
Tx(Important: Health services)    -0.096 
    (0.059) 
Important: Education services    -0.084** 
    (0.039) 
Tx(Important: Education services)    0.107** 
    (0.048) 
Important: Reconstruction    0.030 
    (0.033) 
Tx(Important: Reconstruction)    -0.053 
    (0.057) 
Bashar Al-Assad not being president    0.041 
    (0.057) 
Tx(Bashar Al-Assad not being president)    0.095 
    (0.121) 
Note: Results derived from a linear probability model with governorate of origin, host-country 
accommodation and enumerator specific effects. The total number of observations is 577. Standard errors 
clustered at the enumerator level are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at 







Step-wise Setup of the Regression Model for the Outcome  
‘Return if Syria is as Safe as Before the War’ 
 Return if Syria is as safe as before the war 
Socio-demographic variables     
Respondent is female -0.178**  -0.163*  -0.167*  -0.120   
 (0.081)   (0.086)   (0.087)   (0.071)   
Tx(Respondent is female) 0.139   0.126   0.136   0.104   
 (0.102)   (0.105)   (0.110)   (0.096)   
Household head -0.398**  -0.386**  -0.399**  -0.394**  
 (0.159)   (0.168)   (0.181)   (0.181)   
Tx(Household head) 0.374**  0.348*  0.365*  0.390*  
 (0.173)   (0.181)   (0.193)   (0.193)   
Age 0.003**  0.003*  0.001   0.001   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Tx(Age) -0.002   -0.002   0.001   0.001   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.003)   
Married -0.041   -0.037   -0.023   -0.017   
 (0.048)   (0.047)   (0.021)   (0.045)   
Tx(Married) 0.165*  0.180**  0.168**  0.108   
 (0.086)   (0.085)   (0.077)   (0.087)   
Duration of stay (log) -0.125**  -0.132**  -0.133*  -0.160*** 
 (0.059)   (0.056)   (0.076)   (0.056)   
Tx(Duration of stay) 0.144   0.176*  0.185*  0.175*  
 (0.090)   (0.093)   (0.105)   (0.086)   
Secondary/vocational education -0.112   -0.125   -0.113   -0.089   
 (0.076)   (0.084)   (0.079)   (0.060)   
Tx(Secondary/vocational education) 0.183   0.209*  0.196   0.140   
 (0.111)   (0.113)   (0.116)   (0.103)   
University education -0.069   -0.084   -0.061   -0.051   
 (0.152)   (0.163)   (0.156)   (0.128)   
Tx(University education) 0.005   0.049   0.034   -0.008   
 (0.171)   (0.183)   (0.179)   (0.150)   
Economic variables     
Self-rated poor  -0.114   -0.103   -0.122   
  (0.120)   (0.118)   (0.111)   
Tx(Self-rated poor)  0.168   0.150   0.143   
  (0.135)   (0.133)   (0.127)   
Income category host country   0.001   0.006   0.009   
  (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.021)   
Tx(Income category host country)  -0.045   -0.052*  -0.066*  
  (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.034)   
Costs of escape (log)  -0.004   -0.004   -0.004   
  (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.006)   
Tx(Costs of escape)  0.018   0.016   0.019   
  (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.024)   
Feeling of belonging     
Family members in host country   -0.083*  -0.106   
   (0.044)   (0.065)   
Tx(Family members in host country)   0.006   0.040   
   (0.090)   (0.104)   
Does not feel welcome in host country   0.110*  0.108*  
   (0.055)   (0.055)   
Tx(Does not feel welcome in host country)   -0.223*** -0.191**  
   (0.076)   (0.074)   
No assets in Syria   -0.131*** -0.148*** 
   (0.044)   (0.042)   
Tx(No assets in Syria)   0.089   0.078   
   (0.081)   (0.081)   
     
33 
 
Institutional preferences     
Important: Freedom of speech    0.020   
    (0.020)   
Tx(Important: Freedom of speech)    -0.055   
    (0.040)   
Important: Freedom of belief    -0.013   
    (0.018)   
Tx(Important: Freedom of belief)    0.048   
    (0.028)   
Important: Health services    0.053   
    (0.058)   
Tx(Important: Health services)    -0.001   
    (0.068)   
Important: Education services    -0.076*  
    (0.038)   
Tx(Important: Education services)    0.092   
    (0.054)   
Important: Reconstruction    0.042   
    (0.036)   
Tx(Important: Reconstruction)    -0.028   
    (0.049)   
Bashar Al-Assad not being president    0.085*  
    (0.047)   
Tx(Bashar Al-Assad not being president)    0.078   
    (0.088)   
Note: Results derived from a linear probability model with governorate of origin, host-country 
accommodation and enumerator specific effects. The total number of observations is 577. Standard errors 
clustered at the enumerator level are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at 








Marginal Effects from a Logistic Regression 
 Return ever 
Return after two 
years 
Return if Syria is as 
safe as before the 
war 
Socio-demographic variables    
Respondent is female 0.281 0.093 -0.008 
 (0.207) (0.100) (0.119) 
Tx(Respondent is female)  -0.359* -0.095 -0.030 
 (0.215) [0.095]  (0.138) (0.136) 
Household head  -0.311** 0.113  -0.639*** 
 (0.157) [0.048] (0.170) (0.180) [0.000] 
Tx(Household head) 0.384** -0.075 0.646*** 
 (0.185) [0.038] (0.179) (0.193) [0.001] 
Age 0.013*** -0.003 0.001 
 (0.005) [0.009] (0.008) (0.005) 
Tx(Age)  -0.017*** 0.006 0.000 
 (0.006) [0.002] (0.010) (0.006) 
Married 0.258*** -0.104 -0.014 
 (0.095) [0.007] (0.088) (0.108) 
Tx(Married)  -0.207* 0.041 0.108 
 (0.123) [0.092] (0.103) (0.130) 
Duration of stay (log) -0.080 -0.147  -0.304*** 
 (0.113) (0.154) (0.119) [0.010] 
Tx(Duration of stay) 0.100 0.100 0.311** 
 (0.138) (0.166) (0.131) [0.017] 
Secondary/vocational education -0.012 -0.020 -0.178 
 (0.041) (0.155) (0.114) 
Tx(Secondary/vocational education) -0.091 -0.172 0.227 
 (0.115) (0.183) (0.145) 
University education 0.124 0.004 -0.110 
 (0.085) (0.158) (0.188) 
Tx(University education)  -0.313*** -0.282 0.048 
 (0.111) [0.005] (0.201) (0.197) 
Economic variables    
Self-rated poor 0.028 -0.219 -0.291 
 (0.062) (0.190) (0.370) 
Tx(Self-rated poor) 0.163 0.219 0.313 
 (0.168) (0.221) (0.370) 
Income category host country   -0.076*** 0.054 0.052 
 (0.025) [0.002] (0.040) (0.054) 
Tx(Income category host country) 0.036 -0.078  -0.113* 
 (0.036) (0.056) (0.062) [0.071] 
Costs of escape (log) 0.036*** 0.038  -0.008** 
 (0.006) [0.000] (0.035) (0.004) [0.031] 
Tx(Costs of escape)  -0.057** -0.071 0.019 
 (0.026) [0.027] (0.043) (0.021) 
Feeling of belonging    
Family members in host country  -0.331** -0.031 -0.231 
 (0.145) [0.023] (0.182) (0.165) 
Tx(Family members in host country) 0.490*** -0.064 0.163 
 (0.153) [0.001] (0.194) (0.184) 
Does not feel welcome in host country -0.011 0.141** 0.232*** 
 (0.056) (0.067) [0.034] (0.072) [0.001] 
Tx(Does not feel welcome in host country) -0.091 -0.095  -0.316*** 
 (0.071) (0.089) (0.095) [0.001] 
No assets in Syria  -0.248***  -0.136***  -0.310*** 
 (0.068) [0.000] (0.045) [0.003] (0.056) [0.000] 
Tx(No assets in Syria) 0.067 0.041 0.214** 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.087) [0.014] 
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Institutional preferences     
Important: Freedom of speech -0.040 0.041 0.126* 
 (0.068) (0.052) (0.065) [0.052] 
Tx(Important: Freedom of speech) 0.055 -0.059  -0.166** 
 (0.082) (0.065) (0.078) [0.033] 
Important: Freedom of belief 0.004  -0.066*  -0.070** 
 (0.057) (0.035) [0.059] (0.033) [0.036] 
Tx(Important: Freedom of belief) 0.053 0.111** 0.111** 
 (0.072) (0.052) [0.034] (0.044) [0.013] 
Important: Health services 0.150** 0.136 0.040 
 (0.062) [0.016] (0.121) (0.112) 
Tx(Important: Health services)  -0.155** -0.148 0.003 
 (0.076) [0.042] (0.127) (0.117) 
Important: Education services  -0.195*** -0.105  -0.121** 
 (0.047) [0.000] (0.088) (0.053) [0.022] 
Tx(Important: Education services) 0.173*** 0.136 0.147** 
 (0.060) [0.004] (0.091) (0.063) [0.020] 
Important: Reconstruction 0.066*** 0.056 0.104 
 (0.012) [0.000] (0.060) (0.077) 
Tx(Important: Reconstruction) 0.000 -0.080 -0.086 
 (0.036) (0.073) (0.089) 
Bashar Al-Assad not being president 0.258*** 0.059 0.076 
 (0.058) [0.000] (0.074) (0.080) 
Tx(Bashar Al-Assad not being president) -0.109 0.069 0.093 
 (0.103) (0.132) (0.105) 
Information shock    
Negative information 0.005 0.078 0.065 
 (0.029) (0.150) (0.076) 
Tx(Negative information) -0.083 -0.171  -0.161* 
 (0.089) (0.159) (0.084) [0.055] 
Positive information 0.004 0.007 -0.107 
 (0.046) (0.127) (0.136) 
Tx(Positive information) -0.072 -0.115 -0.003 
 (0.083) (0.132) (0.149) 
Note: Results derived from a logistic regression model with governorate of origin, host-country accommodation and 
enumerator specific effects included as dummy variables. The total number of observations is 577. Standard errors 
clustered at the enumerator level are presented in parentheses; p-values resulting from the multi-way clustering are 
presented in brackets next to the clustered standard errors whenever the multi-way clustered p-value is ≤ 10%. 









Regression Model including Predetermined Covariates and Information Treatment 
 Return ever 
Return after two 
years 
Return if Syria is 
as safe as 
before the war 
Socio-demographic variables    
Respondent is female 0.204 0.005 -0.141*  
 (0.192) (0.054) (0.081)   
Tx(Respondent is female) -0.233 -0.027 0.097   
 (0.196) (0.107) (0.103)   
Household head -0.250 0.043 -0.378**  
 (0.149) (0.098) (0.162)   
Tx(Household head) 0.292* -0.046 0.353*  
 (0.170) (0.111) (0.175)   
Age 0.012*** -0.000 0.003*  
 (0.004) [0.072] (0.004) (0.001)   
Tx(Age) -0.015*** 0.004 -0.002   
 (0.005) [0.018] (0.006) (0.004)   
Married 0.125 -0.045 -0.029   
 (0.115) (0.071) (0.048)   
Tx(Married) -0.047 -0.008 0.166*  
 (0.142) (0.104) (0.089)   
Duration of stay (log) 0.040 -0.100 -0.150**  
 (0.089) (0.099) (0.057) [0.020]  
Tx(Duration of stay) -0.032 0.068 0.191**  
 (0.118) (0.124) (0.092) [0.064]  
Secondary/vocational education -0.050 -0.047 -0.122   
 (0.094) (0.056) (0.076)   
Tx(Secondary/vocational education) -0.019 -0.127 0.200*  
 (0.123) (0.110) (0.106)   
University education 0.110 -0.017 -0.085   
 (0.132) (0.072) (0.158)   
Tx(University education) -0.250 -0.232* 0.044   
 (0.154) (0.125) (0.179)   
Economic variables    
Self-rated poor 0.132 -0.107** -0.123   
 (0.105) (0.040) [0.020] (0.119)   
Tx(Self-rated poor) -0.007 0.148 0.183   
 (0.116) (0.127) (0.134)   
Income category host country  -0.071*** 0.019 -0.001   
 (0.015) [0.002] (0.020) (0.011)   
Tx(Income category host country) 0.069*** -0.020 -0.049   
 (0.024) [0.006] (0.039) (0.030)   
Costs of escape (log) 0.038*** 0.012 -0.004   
 (0.007) [0.000] (0.008) (0.005)   
Tx(Costs of escape) -0.058* -0.043* 0.019   
 (0.028) [0.064] (0.024) [0.092] (0.021)   
Information shock    
Negative information 0.017 0.057 0.044   
 (0.032) (0.055) (0.031)   
Tx(Negative information) -0.090 -0.133* -0.153*** 
 (0.066) (0.077) (0.047) [0.002]  
Positive information -0.042 0.024 -0.042   
 (0.042) (0.067) (0.033)   
Tx(Positive information) 0.009 -0.115 -0.038   
 (0.067) (0.078) (0.067)   
Note: Results derived from a linear probability model with governorate, accommodation and enumerator 
specific effects. The total number of observations is 577. Standard errors clustered at the enumerator 
level are presented in parentheses; p-values resulting from the cluster wild bootstrap procedure with 
1,000 replications are presented in brackets next to the clustered standard errors whenever the wild 
bootstrapped p-value is ≤ 10%. ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
